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UIASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Of the 258 opinions considered by the editorial board, 64 have been
given textual treatment below. Brief summaries of 28 others appear
at the end of the appropriate section. An additional 12 have been
treated in footnotes.
Fields in which no cases believed worthy of note were found are:
Administrative Law, Agency, Bills & Notes, Corporations, Equity,
Partnerships, Public Utilities, and Social Security.
For a survey of statutory law enacted during 1953, see Washington
Legislation-1953, 28 WASH. L. REV. 167 (1953).
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Jurisdiction-Order Affecting Possession of Foreign Land. In
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Molitor,' the Supreme Court held that a trial
court in Washington lacked "jurisdiction" to order a litigant personally
before the court to give up possession of land in Alaska. The litigation
was commenced by a vendor of an interest in land against the vendee
for breach of contract. Prior to trial the plaintiff-vendor moved for an
order directing the defendant-vendee to surrender all right, title and
possession of the premises described in the agreement. The trial judge
indicated he would issue the order. The defendant then applied to the
Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition which was granted.
The court indicated that the order of the trial court would require
the defendant to do an affirmative act outside the state affecting real
property located outside the state and hence was not within the juris-
diction of the court.
Generally, a trial court will not issue such an order under circum-
stances similar to those found in this case. Refusal is usually based
upon principles of sovereignty (a state has a sovereign or inherent
right to decide exclusively controversies affecting land located within
its borders2), or upon pragmatic reasons (a state in which property is
1143 Wash. Dec. 606, 263 P.2d 276 (1953).
2 The significance of the situs of real property is demonstrated in the prevailing rule
that actions in law (including the action of trespass) involving property are "local"
and not "transitory"; hence, the venue must be laid in the county in wihch the property
is located. This distinction between "local" and "transitory" actions (which is often
criticized) is usually traced in this country to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in
Livingston v. Jefferson, 1 Brock. 203, Fed. Case No. 8411 (1811). Even Marshall
indicated that he could not discern a reason other than a technical one for the distinc-
tion. See Taylor v. Sommers Bros. Match Co., 35 Idaho 30, 204 Pac. 472 (1922). A
court of equity cannot make a decree operating directly on land in another state. Car-
penter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87 (1891). Nor need any decree attempting to do so be
given full faith and credit. Fail v. Fall, 70 Neb. 694, 113 N.W. 174 (1907), affirmed in
Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
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located is in a better position to administer and to see that there is
compliance with any such order, and possibly to protect the interests
or claims of third parties'). Venue statutes are sometimes held to be
controlling, or at least indicative of a general policy in the forum-state
not to hear controversies involving realty except in the county, and
by analogy, also in the state, in which the property is located.4
Considering all of the information contained in the pleadings and
affidavits in this case, an order to vacate possession seemingly would
have been improper. " However, it is submitted that the proper basis,
or at least a better basis, for disapproving such orders involve principles
analagous to comity rather than any theory of lack of jurisdiction. In
other words based upon every consideration of policy, expediency and
property, the court will abstain from exercising its jurisdiction in con-
troversies of this character under these circumstances.6
Compare the following:
(1) A, the owner of Blackacre located in state Z, contractually
agrees to transfer title to B on a certain date. The date arrives, but
A refuses to transfer title. B hales A into court in state Y, seeking
specific performance of the contract. While there is a long-standing
rule that a court cannot try or quiet "title"' to property located in
another state,' a court in Y can and undoubtedly will issue an order in
personam requiring A to make a conveyance. The Washington court
has indicated that a trial court in this state would have the power to
issue such an order because the act required (the conveyance of title)
3 See Gunter v. Arlington Mills, 271 Mass. 314, 171 N.E. 486 (1930); GOODRICI,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 77 (1949) ; BAL, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 94.2 (1935).4 The Washington court in the Molitor case referred to RCW 4.12.010 which pro-
vides that actions involving possession or title of land or any specific article of personal
property must be commenced in the county in which the property is located. The court
has held that the provisions in the statute are jurisdictional and cannot be waived.
Miles v. Chinto Mining Co., 21 Wn.2d 902, 153 P.2d 856 (1944). Query? Does not the
statute refer only to actions at law as distinguished from suits in equity operating in
personam? Jurisdiction and venue are not always clearly distinguished by courts and
legislatures. See Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 MICH.
L. REv. 307, 316-323 (1951).
5 Statements were in conflict as to whether the defendant still had possession of the
land in Alaska, and if so, whether he held possession under the agreement with the
plaintiff or by virtue of a new lease from the city of Anchorage which owned the fee.
0 For a good discussion of this position, see Gunter v. Arlington Mills, 271 Mass.
314, 171 N.E. 486 (1930). See also RESTATEMENT, CONFLICTS § 94 (1934) and Com-
ment that follows; GooDRICH, CONFLICT OF LAW § 77 (1949).
7 Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87 (1891); Snow v. Kennedy 36 Ariz. 475, 286
Pac. 930 (1930). But see Remer v. Mackey, 35 Fed. 86 (N.D. IIl. 1888) and 54 Fed.
432 (N.D. Ill. 1892) where it was held that a court having personal jurisdiction of the
parties may decree the removal of a cloud on lands situated in another state. By
issuing such a decree, the court said it was not being asked to pass upon the title to
the land.
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could be performed within the state.8
(2) Same as above, except that the agreement is not to transfer
title but to turn over possession. Could not a court in Y properly order
A to allow B to take possession peaceably (admittedly, an order re-
quiring negative acts), or if A has possession through an agent, require
A to issue an order, which act can be done in Y, to his agent in Z to
vacate the property so B can take possession? Would the court be
trying a question of "possession" in the legal or real property sense
anymore than it is trying a question of "title" in the first hypothetical?
Courts have on occasion required defendants to do affirmative acts
outside of the state.' In a case quite similar to the instant case, the
California supreme court held that a trial court could properly order
a corporate board of directors to direct agents in control of corporate
property in Arizona to allow the plaintiff to enter, inspect and examine
the Arizona property.10
Admittedly, adoption of the principle of "refusal to exercise jurisdic-
tion" rather than a total "lack of jurisdiction" might have made it
impossible for the supreme court to issue the writ of prohibition in
the Molitor case. The exercise of jurisdiction by the trial judge would,
at most, have been only anc abuse of discretion, for which the writ
will not lie."
However, the writ possibly could have been issued on another
ground. The sanction which the court intended to impose for failure
to obey its order involved the striking of the defendant's pleadings
and the entering of a default judgment for the plaintiff. The power
of a court to strike pleadings or issue a default judgment for disobedi-
ence of an order should apply only to orders affecting the case pro-
cedurally, and should not be applicable to orders which affect the
substantive rights of the parties or the subject matter of the litigation."
8 Donaldson v. Greenwood, 40 Wn.2d 238, 242 P.2d 1038 (1952).
9 This is especially true when the affirmative order is to abate a nuisance which is
affecting citizens or property in the forum. See the Salton Sea Cases, 172 Fed. 792 at
812 (C.A. 9th 1909) ; BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 97.14 (1935).
10 Hobbs v. Tom Reed Gold Min. Co., 164 Cal. 497, 129 Pac. 781 (1913); the
court stated at 129 Pac. at 783: "[The courti will not refuse any relief because it
cannot give the full relief that plaintiff asks, or because it cannot act directly upon the
premises to which the relief relates." The West Virginia Supreme Court stated in
dictum that a trial court in that state had the power to appoint a receiver to take
possession of personal property in Ohio, even though it lacked power to order the
receiver to personally go to Ohio to take possession. The court indicated that the trial
court, which had jurisdiction of the defendant, could legitimately do all within its
power to compel the defendant to put the receiver in possession of the property.
Straughan v. Hallwood 30 W.Va. 274, 4 S.E. 394 (1887).
11 In re Jones, 39 Wn.2d 956, 239 P.2d 856 (1942). See also RCW 7.16.300.
12 See RULE OF PLEADING, PRACTICE AND PaOCEDURE 37, 34A Wn.2d 101 (involving
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It is arguable that the issuance of such an order would not have been
merely an abuse of power or discretion, but would have been in excess
of the judge's power and, hence, beyond his jurisdiction. If so, this
would have been a proper basis for issuing a writ of prohibition.'3
WILLIAM E. LovE.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Enrolled Bill Rule. In two recent decisions, Derby Club v. Beckett'
and Roehl v. Public Utility District,2 four members of the Supreme
Court have written opinions which challenge the validity of the enrolled
bill rule. In the Derby Club case, the 1951 act which purported to
license the operation of bottle clubs3 was attacked on the ground that
it was enacted in violation of Art. II, § 38 of the state constitution.'
The defendants demurred, but relied on the enrolled bill rule in their
argument on appeal. The majority of the court held the statute un-
constitutional on other grounds, but two concurring opinions were filed,
representing the views of four judges, in which the position was taken
that the court should abandon the enrolled bill rule. In the Roeld case,
the statute giving the Public Utility District authority to acquire sub-
stantially all of the electric utility properties of Puget Sound Power &
Light' was alleged to be invalid, also under Article II, § 38. In. support
of their contention, the plaintiffs introduced certified copies of several
House bills and the legislative journal. Having the enrolled bill rule
thus directly- raised in issue, the majority wrote an extensive opinion
adhering to the long line of Washington authority upholding the en-
rolled bill rule. The same judges that spoke against the enrolled bill
rule in the Derby Club case expressed their dissent in this case.'
discovery). RCW 4.56.120 (6) authorizes the court to grant a nonsuit when a defendant
fails to comply with an order of the court (presumably an order affecting pre-trial or
trial pleading or procedure), but there is no comparable statutory authority authorizing
a default judgment when a defendant refuses to obey an order. However, Rule 37(d)
does permit a court to grant a default judgment for the defendant's failure to comply
with an order involving discovery.
Is While the court did not decide the case on the propriety of the sanction which
the trial judge intended to impose, it did question the propriety of such an order
which would change the "status quo" between the parties prior to a trial on the merits.
141 Wn.2d 869, 252 P.2d 259 (1953).
2 143 Wash. Dec. 198, 261 P.2d 92 (1953).
3 RCW 66.24.480.
4 "No amendment to any bill shall be allowed which shall change the scope and
object of the bill." WAsH. Coxs=. ART. II, § 38.
5 RCW 80.40.054.
6 One of the judges who joined in the opinions against the enrolled bill rule in the
previous case voted with the majority in this case, so the decision was six to three.
However, in his concurring opinion, he stated that he still was not in favor of the rule.
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